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Abstract 
 
The main characteristic of the Latin American migration on the 20th century was the change of 
flow.  Until the 1950s, Latin America received migrants from Europe and the Middle East.  As a 
result of economic change, political instability, and economic crisis, Latin America started 
exporting migrant workers.  Now, Latin American migrants mainly go to the U.S., and in less 
extend to Europe (i.e. Spain, Italy, and Portugal), and in some cases to Japan as it is the case of 
Peru and Brazil.  Several migrant patterns follow this process, which is characteristic to the 
massive emigration at the dawn of the 21st century. 
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Introduction 
 History shows that migration processes are reversible. Countries receiving immigrants 
can turn into countries of emigration, and countries that people were  emigrating from may 
become countries attracting immigrants. This is what has happened to some countries in Europe 
and the opposite is now occurring in Latin America. In the last fifty years, the region of Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC) has stopped being an attractive destination for immigrants 
from Europe, the Far East and the Middle East, and is now emerging on the international scene 
as a source of emigration.  
 The process has been slow to develop, but now involves all the countries of the region. 
Although there is a general dynamic, the behaviour of each country may be very different. Some 
migration processes definitely head towards a single direction, while others have several possible 
destinations and others again have many points of arrival. In a microcsom as small as the 
Hispanic Caribbean Islands three types of migration process to the United States may be 
distinguished in terms of the migrants’ legal status: Cubans tend to emigrate as refugees, Puerto 
Ricans with an American passport and Dominicans either legally or without papers. Its 
hetereogeneity is a special characteristic of Latin American and Caribbean emigration, but it is 
still possible to mark stages, define processes and study in depth particular patterns that are 
common throughout the region. 
The aim of this article is to approach the subject from a historical and sociological 
perspective. The general picture is given precedence over the specifics of each country. 
Obviously, much will have to be left out, and many particularities left to one side. The migration 
adventure is a personal adventure undertaken by people with names and surnames, which for 
reasons of space and focus we have had to ignore so as to be able to concentrate on the most 
relevant processes. Processes that gain relevance because they are important numerically. The 
quantitative dimension is a basic characteristic of the phenomenon of migration, more especially 
when it is realized that migration is not only an academic subject but also a matter of public 
policy.  
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The paper is divided into four parts. The background section gives an account of the 
initial phase, when Latin America and the Caribbean was a land receiving migrants, a place of 
immigration. The second part explains how the processes, patterns and general tendencies of 
emigration from the region have developed. The third section addresses the impact of migration 
on human development, with particular emphasis on remittances. The fourth section develops the 
subject of migration policies and the capacities that Latin Americans have for migrating and 
learning to live in different places around the world. Finally the article concludes with a brief 
summing-up. 
1.- Historical background.   
For four-and-a-half centuries, from the sixteenth century to half way through the twentieth, Latin 
America and the Caribbean was a territory receiving immigrants, about 20 million people from 
all over the world. There are at least four reasons that can explain such a long process of racial 
and cultural exchange. First of all, the history of colonial relations with Spain and Portugal, and 
later the interest of other European powers in the region (England, France and Holland). 
Secondly, the spread of the system of slavery, which planted some eight million Africans as 
slaves, most of whom were concentrated in Brazil, Peru and the West Indies. A third factor has 
to do with the vastness of the region’s natual resources and the endless unoccupied lands that 
were offered up for colonization, in order to attract immigrants. Finally, during the first half of 
the twentieth century, there was a significant development of the economy in the region, and a 
number of Latin American countries had a GDP that was equal to or higher than that of the 
European countries with the largest numbers of people emigrating. In the 1920s, Argentina, 
Chile and Uruguay had a per capita income higher than in Italy, Spain and Portugal. Between 
1940 and 1970 Latin America grew at an average rate of 5% a year. In the same period Mexico 
had her economic miracle and Venezuela experienced an oil boom. In 1950 Argentina, Chile, 
Uruguay and Venezuela, Peru, Mexico and Colombia, had a GDP rate above that of Spain and 
Portugal (Solimano, 2008).  
The case of the Caribbean is somewhat different. Although these general factors apply, it 
is necessary to recognize that the history of the West Indies is far more complex, owing to 
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processes of delayed independence, the large number of small nations, the continuance of 
colonial and neo-colonial relations and the permanency of the notion of overseas territories. 
During the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, all the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean received immigrants. However, the cases of Argentina, Brasil and 
Venezuela stand out. The Immigrants Museum of Argentina, el Museo del Inmigrante Argentina 
(2009), has records of about 5 million people who arrived at her ports between 1857 and 1920. 
Other calculations estimate that between 1870 and 1950 Argentina took in around 6 million 
European immigrants, especially from Italy and y Spain (Solimano, 2008).  
Further, the Immigration Museum of Brazil, el Museo de la Inmigración en  Brasil (2009) 
which has records for entries into the country through the principal ports of entry, reports that 
between 1870 and 1953 just over 5.2 million immigrants came in, of whom 4.5 million were of 
European origin, mainly from Italy, Portugal and Spain; and half a million came from other parts 
of the world (Syrians, Lebanese, Palestinians, Koreans and Greeks), while around 200,000 were 
from Japan and started to arrive at the beginning of the twentieth century.  
Later, in the middle of the twentieth century, Venezuela was also to become an attractive 
place for immigrants. From the sixties till after the seventies, people arrived mostly from 
Portugal, Italy and Spain. Then came the intra-regional migrants, mainly from Colombia and to a 
lesser extent from Ecuador, Peru and the Dominican Republic. Migration flows came to an end 
in 1983 with the oil price crisis (Van Roy, 1987). 
 As well as immigation from Europe, immigrants came from the East and the Middle East. 
Those of Japanese origin settled for the most part in Brazil and Peru; the Chinese are spread over 
many countries but have a significant presence in Peru, Panama, Brazil and Cuba. Immigrants 
from the Middle East (Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Turkey, etc.) tend to be scattered, but they have 
a significant presence in Chile, Brazil, Peru, Argentina, Mexico and Central America (Le Monde, 
2008; Marimoto, 1999; Masato, 2002; Cuche, 2001). 
 The final waves of immigrants into Latin America and the Caribbean took place in the 
context of the Second World War. Refugees from the Spanish civil war came over and were 
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welcomed as such in Mexico (20,000), the Dominican Republic (3,000) and Chile (2000). Tens 
of thousands of immigrants also arrived with visas obtained in other Latin American embassies. 
Subsequently the second world war brought over as immigrants another batch of displaced 
persons from different parts of Europe. In the fifties, the flow of immigrants to Latin America 
and the Caribbean almost dried up, with the exception of Venezuela which would continue to 
receive people from Spain, Italy and Portugal until after the seventies.   
 After four and a half centuries of immigration to Latin America and the Caribbean, the 
flow of migrants changed direction, with, first, the intense processes of internal migration, from 
rural to urban and especially to the capitals and metropolises of Latin America. In the seventies 
migration flows started between countries in the region and to the United States and Canada. 
Finally, towards the end of the twentieth century, emigration to Europe and other parts of the 
world got underway. 
2.- Processes, patterns and tendencies. Internal and international migration in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (1950-2008). 
There are a number of global and regional factors that have influenced the start and the 
development of the Latin American migration process in this period: the geopolitical context of 
the Cold War in the region, the high rates of demographic growth, the limitations and 
contradictions of economic models and the demand for cheap labour from industrialized nations 
with a high rating on the human development index (HDI).       
The geopolitical context   
After the Second World War, international migration flows changed and were redirected 
according to the situation in different regions. In Europe there were two processes: the 
recruitment of temporary workers and the immigration of workers who came from colonies and 
former colonies. Latin America participated in this process with the emigration of workers from 
the West Indies to their various colonial metropolises: in England, France and Holland  (Martin 
and Zucher, 2008).  
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In the continent of America, the United States implemented a dual migration policy: 
hiring cheap labour in the nearby region of Mexico and the Caribbean, and the political control 
of migration from other countries in accordance with various conjunctions marked by the 
development of the Cold War in the region. For the U.S.A., Mexico and Puerto Rico were 
regarded as natural reserves of labour, which could be made use of according to the needs of the 
U.S. labour market. Puerto Rico operates in the sphere of colonial relations, and Mexico in the 
sphere of dependence and immediate proximity. The colonial relation with Puerto Rico makes it 
impossible to disdain or deport labour, while, to the contrary, in the case of Mexico labour is 
both readily available and disposable. (Duany, 2002; Durand, et al. 1999). Mexico is the chief 
supplier of cheap labour to the United States which right up to the present comes in three 
different types: legal migration, undocumented migration and temporary migration with various 
kinds of H2 visa  (Durand, 2007). 
In addition to the hiring of workers from Mexico, Puerto Rico and the West Indies, 
another determining factor was that played by geopolitical considerations, in the context of the 
cold war, on the migration flows from Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and, later, Central 
America. In the case of Cuba, even today there is an ample refugee policy. In the case of the 
Dominican Republic, the U.S. had recourse to military intervention (1965) and legal emigration 
was encouraged as a means of exercising political control. It was in Central America that the last 
battles of the cold war were fought in the eighties, and in some cases a refugee policy was 
applied and in others it was the political control of undocumented migration (Durand, et al., 
2007; Pedraza, 2007). For the rest of Latin America, migration flows operated basically 
motivated by economic factors and those of domestic policy, and this would apply to Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. The military interventions in Granada and Haiti also provoked 
migration flows, but on a much smaller scale.  
On the other hand, the indirect intervention of the United States in countries such as 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela served to some 
extent as a retaining wall for mass emigration. The dictators and the military tend to put blocks 
on free transit and tend to lean on popular sectors for their support. In the dictatorships of Chile, 
Argentina, Uruguay and Bolivia, those who emigrated were basically left wing dissidents and 
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these preferred to seek asylum in France, Canada, Sweden, Mexico and Venezuela, rather than 
the United States  (Angell and Carstairs, 1987; Wright and Oñate, 2007).  
The demographic factor 
Also determining the migration processes were the high birth rates in the region. During 
the fifties and sixties, population growth in Latin America was explosive.    In 1950 the total 
fertility rate was  5.88 children per woman, which increased to 5.93 in 1955 and kept rising till it 
reached its maximum of 5.97 in 1960. Yet every country had its own peculiarities. In Mexico, 
the total fertility rate (children per woman) was very high (6.70) as it was in Brazil (6.15), while 
in Argentina it was much less (3.45).  In the United States the rate from 1950-1955 was at 3.45 
and in the next period, which was that of the “baby  boom” it rose to 3.71. Whereas in Europe 
the rate from 1950-1955 was 2.66 and in Latin America and the Caribbean taken as a whole, the 
rate was 5.88, just over twice as high. Half a century later, in the period of 2000-2005, Latin 
America and the Caribbean reached a fertility rate similar to that of Europe in the fifties. In 
absolute terms the HDI tripled in fifty years and the size of the population grew from 167 million 
in 1950 to 523 million in the year 2000 (United Nations, 2007).  
In some cases, such as that of Mexico, birth control policies were highly successful, and 
the birth rate came down from 6.80, the highest figure in the period 1955-1960, to 2.40 in the 
period 2000-2005. However, there are other countries where birth control policies have not been 
applied with the same rigour, such as Guatemala, which had a rate of 7.00 children per woman in 
1950-55, which came down to 4.60 in the period 2000-2005. In the whole of Latin America and 
the Caribbean, there is a decrease in the birth rate, but the rhythms and tendencies are different 
(United Nations,  2007).  
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Table 1.  Birth rate (children per woman) for Latin America and the Caribbean, Mexico, 
Argentina, Brazil, United States and Europe. 1950-2005 
 50-
55 
55-
60 
60-
65 
65-
70 
70-
75 
75-
80 
80-
85 
85-
90 
90-
95 
95-
00 
00-
05 
LAC 5.88 5.93 5.97 5.54 5.04 4.48 3.92 3.41 3.03 2.73 2.52 
Mexico 6.70 6.80 6.75 6.75 6.50 5.25 4.25 3.63 3.19 2.67 2.40 
Argentina 3.15 3.13 3.09 3.05 3.15 3.44 3.15 3.05 2.90 2.63 2.35 
Brazil 6.15 6.15 6.15 5.38 4.72 4.31 3.80 3.10 2.60 2.45 2.35 
USA 3.45 3.71 3.31 2.55 2.02 1.79 1.83 1.92 2.03 1.99 2.04 
Europe 2.66 2.66 2.58 2.36 2.16 1.97 1.89 1.83 1.97 1.40 1.41 
Source: original elaboration based on data in United Nations, 2007. 
In one way or another, the demographic growth of LAC from the fifties to the eighties, 
led to there being a largely young population that was three times bigger than before. The 
demographic boon of Latin America has allowed it to become a net exporter of labour since the 
end of the twentieth century. However, the flows of immigrants in Latin America tend to be 
intra-regional, so it is possible that in twenty years the population may stabilize at a rate of 
replacement without increase. If this demographic process were to be accompanied by sustained 
economic growth then Latin America and the Caribbean might cease to be a region producing 
flows of emigration quite soon.     
Economic models 
 Finally, it is necessary to consider the permanent background of a critical economic 
situation in Latin America during the second half of the twentieth century.   According to Park 
(1995) The Alliance for Progress, an ambitious programme of the United States for the 
development of the region (1961-1970), did not reach the objectives hoped for and was 
considered a failure. The import substitution model reached its limits in 1970, and its chief 
exponents, Mexico and Brazil, sunk into sizeable and prolonged economic crises. The eighties is 
considered a “lost decade” for the whole region. A number of related factors contributed to the 
debacle: the exorbitant sizes of foreign debt, uncontrolled inflation, recurring devaluations, 
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political instability and the opening to foreign markets (deregulation) (Kliksberg, 2001). The 
combination of several factors: poverty, inequality and the precarious condition of the labor 
market,  along with foreign demand for labor, created the right conditions for emigration 
(Solimano, 2008).   
Furthermore, with the new economic model of neoliberalism, which started to spread in 
the eighties, came the dismantling of national industries, banking crises and a worsening of the 
situation in the rural environment. Only a few exporting sectors have benefited substantially. At 
any rate, half way through the nineties  the economic recovery for Latin America began and it 
entered a phase of political stability. With the end of the Cold War, the United States moderated 
her political interventionism in Latin America and became a fervent promoter of democracy. At 
the very same time, the U.S. refashioned a new economic policy that was based on the 
“Washington Consensus” and consisted of a general alignment to neoliberal policies and to 
joining world markets.    
It looked during the first years of the twenty-first century as though the sun had begun to 
shine on Latin America. The economy of the region as a whole had started to grow. For the year 
2007 the estimated growth rate was an average of 4.5 for the whole region. Chile, Brazil and 
Peru had sustained high growth rates for more than five years. On the other hand, Mexico and 
Argentina still had not got off the ground. But the growth of Latin America in these years was 
due more to the push from China and India as consumers of raw materials, than to successes of 
the new economic model and the effects of being in tow to the North American economy. 1 The 
bonanza did not last long. The financial and economic crisis of 2008 inverted the tendency and 
hard times are expected ahead.    
The particular conditions of Latin America’s polical economy have a direct impact on 
migration flows. During the three decades of 1950 to 1980, the most significant migration flows 
in Latin America were of a domestic character, resulting in the explosive growth of 
megalopolises like Mexico City, Buenos Aires and San Paulo, and big cities like Rio de Janeiro, 
                                                            
1 While Chile, Peru, Argentina y Brazil, linked to the European and Asian markets, grew at rates of 6 and 
7%; Mexico, tightly linked to the North American market, grew at a rate of 2% between the years 2000 
and 2007.  El País, 6 de mayo de 2008.  
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Bogota, Santiago, Caracas and Lima (García Canclini, 2004). During the eighties, the lost decade 
in Latin America, the economic and political crisis reached its lowest level and international 
migration processes, to the United States, Canada and Japan, began to form and develop 
(Takenaka, 2005,  Lesser, 2006, Durand and Massey, 2003). During the nineties and the first five 
years of the twenty-first century the opportunity to emigrate to Europe, especially to Spain, Italy 
and Portugal, is given, and intra-regional migration to  Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Costa Rica, 
is intensified.  
For the first decade of the twenty-first century, we can distinguish three fully 
consolidated international migration processes in Latin America: intra-regional migration, South-
North migration, and transoceanic migration. In each of these processes certain patterns may be 
distinguished for each case in particular. 
3.- Domestic, intra-regional and transit migration  
Domestic migration 
During the nineteen fities and sixties Latin America received the first impact of a demographic 
explosion which was reflected in the growth of capital cities. This was a process of rural-urban 
migration, but also of migration from provincial cities or towns to national capitals. The 
metroplitan centers were a great pole of attraction, where the best labor, health and education 
options were concentrated. But at the same time, they did not have the urban services necessary 
to cater for the arrival of hundreds of thousand of domestic migrants (see Table 2). Neither were 
governments prepared to manage and resolve urban problems provoked by the chaotic unplanned 
urbanization of the barriadas, favelas, and irregular settlements.  
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Table 2 
Urban growth in certain Latin American cities (1940-1960) 
 Rio de Janeiro San Paulo Lima Mexico City 
1940 2,136.682 1,429.574 614,345 1,757,000 
1960 4,691.654 4,368.603 1,641,221 4,589,792 
Source: Unikel, 1975  
When the demand for urban services in the cities was politicized there arose urban social 
movements which would become fundamental protagonists in Latin American urban politics 
during the seventies and eighties. However, it was the economic crisis of the eighties that 
provoked a contraction in employment and put a brake on the explosive growth of these big 
cities. 
As the years and the decades passed, these barriada quarters became popular settlements 
inhabited by lower middle class laborers, industrial workers and employeees. Urbanization took 
shape and allowed formal housing, and many small businesses and family enterprises to develop. 
Not only did the number of inhabitants of the big cities increase, so did the number of 
automobiles. In 1960 there were 248,000 vehicles in Mexico City and in 1970 there were 
680,000 (Bataillón and Riviere D’Arc, 1973). In  2005 the number of automobiles in the Federal 
District had risen to  2.1 million and in the Metroplitan Zone there were 3.5 million. 2 
 The unrestricted growth of many cities generated innumerable problems: traffic, 
pollution, overcrowding, water shortage, violence, insecurity. In this context, the medium sized 
cities of Latin America became a viable option as they had all the services, greater security and a 
better quality of life.     
The full scale of the consequences of rural-urban migration in Latin America come to be 
appreciated at the end of the twentieth century, when the region ceased to be predominantly rural 
and became urban. For example, the urban population in Brazil was only 31% in 1940 and by 
                                                            
2 Diagnosis of mobility in Mexico City: http://www.fimevic.df.gob.mx/problemas/1diagnostico.htm 
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2000 it was 81.2% of the population lived in cities (Instituto Brasilero de Geografía y 
Estadística, 2008). In the case of Mexico a similar tendency is observed, with 42% of the 
population living in zones considered urban in 1950, and in 2005 it was reported that 76.5 % of 
the population ought to be considered urban (INEGI, 2008).  
At the same time, and as part of the same process, thousands of small populations 
disappeared from the map. The process is still proceeding and with considerable intensity as 
another factor has been added: international emigration. In Mexico, for example, in states with a 
high density of international migration, the depopulation of small   localities is worrying: in 
Durango 76.9% of the municipalities had negative growth in the period   1990-2000, 57% in 
Zacatecas, 26.1% in Guanajuato and 25.8% in Jalisco.  
Intra-regional migration   
During the seventies and eighties a number of factors contributed to the development of 
intra-regional and international migration processes. These were the deferred impact of the high 
rates of demographic growth from the forties and the fifties, recurring economic crises and 
generalized political instability. This combination of factors first encouraged intra-regional and 
then in the nineties, international migration processes.    
 According to our definition of the intra-regional migration process, this includes all Latin 
American and Caribbean countries and excludes the United States and Canada which we regard 
as South-North.    
 The intra-regional migration process is characterized by its age and diffusion, but also by 
its moderate intensity. Flows have been predominantly between neighboring countries and to a 
lesser extent between the various sub-regions. Until the seventies movement was mostly within 
Meso-America, the Caribbean or South America. Due in good measure to the limitations of that 
particular time and to the lack of routes of communication. It was also more difficult to travel 
because passports and visas were required. Perhaps the exception was Argentina, which always 
kept its doors open to immigration, did not require a visa and where it was easy to prolong one’s 
stay and work informally. Later, during the seventies and eighties and with dictators of every 
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kind, it became more difficult to travel, but the number of refugees forced to leave increased. It 
was in the ninenties that travel, commerce and tourism began to be liberalized. 
Two patterns of migration can be distinguished in the intra-regional context: migrations 
of a short distance and for a limited period of time across borders, and those of greater distances 
and medium length stays directed to cities.  
Border migration is of a temporary nature, over a short distance, and linked in many 
cases to the rhythms of harvest seasons, especially of coffee, tobacco, fruits, vegetables and 
sugar cane. Such are the cases of Bolivian migrant families who work in the sugar and the 
tobacco harvests in Northern Argentina (Danler and Medeiros, 1991); the Paraguyans who go to 
the subtropical crops, the horticultural and fruticultural villas of North-Eastern Argentina (Balán, 
1988); the Peruvians who harvest banana and mango in Ecuador, because the wages are paid in 
dollars; the Nicaraguan peasants and the Ngöbe indigenous peoples of Panama who go to harvest 
coffee in Costa Rica (Alverenga, 2000; Rosero, 2002); the Guatemalans who harvest coffee and 
fruits in the plantations of Chiapas in Mexico (Mosquera, 1990); the Colombians who work in 
agriculture in the frontier regions of Zulia and Andes, in Venezuela (Van Roy, 1987), the people 
of the Dominican Republic who go to the sugar cane and coffee harvests in Puerto Rico (Pascual 
and Figueroa, 2000) and the Haitians who go to cut the cane and harvest the coffee in the 
Dominican Republic (Catanese, 1999; Grasmuck, 1982). 
In Latin America border migration is made much easier because often those who take 
part are indigenous populations whose ethnic territories lie both sides of the border. Thus the 
immigrants from a neighbouring nation can blend in with people from the same ethnic group 
living in the country they have come to. Such is the case of the Mayans of Mexico and 
Guatemala, the Yanomami of Venezuela and Brazil, the Guajiro of Colombia and Venezuela, the 
Quechua of Bolivia and the North of Argentina, the Ayamara of Peru and Bolivia, the Guarani of 
Paraguay and Argentina. In many of these cases one cannot even speak of migration, because it 
is a question of mobility across ancestral lands. Similarly with certain Mexican, and certain 
Canadian tribes, who not only have free transit but also dual nationality, which is the case of the 
Kikapoo (Durand, 1994). Further, in the case of mestizo border migrants, these tend to have the 
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same phenotype, culture and language as their neighbours. Which makes processes of integration 
in border zones much more fluid and dynamic than in cities (Durand and Massey, 2009).   
 Intra-regional migration to cities, in turn, has two modalities: that of migrants of middle 
class and professional status, and that of workers and peasants, which is the larger group. The 
distinction is justified because in most cases the two types of migrant do not mix. The migrants 
in the first group with technical or professional qualifications tend  to go to capital cities.  
Usually the decision to migrate is a personal choice, in search of a better job, better education 
and better prospects for professional development prospects. The other type is connected to 
migration networks, old family ties and mixed marriages. Finally, there are constantly more 
cases of migration induced by firms that have representatives and businesses in various 
countries.   
A number of countries in the region have been receiving professional Latin American 
migrants: Venezuela, Mexico, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Chile, Brazil and Argentina. In the case of 
Venezuela, the oil boom of 1950 to 1980 created an unusual demand for both professionals and 
unqualified workers. According to the migratory regularization figures for 1980, 12.3% of 
Bolivian immigrants had university qualifications; as did 10% of the Peruvians, 7.8% of the 
Chileans and 8.9% of the Argentineans (Van Roy, 1987). At present the number of people born 
abroad is close to one million, and they represent 4.4% of the population, which is the highest 
indicator for Latin America. On a much smaller scale, Mexico as well as Ecuador, Chile, 
Argentina and Brazil attracts professional migrants because it can offer relative improvements in 
terms of salaries. This category of city migrants should include migrants exiled for political 
reasons, usually left wing dissidents who emigrated in order to seek asylum in the seventies and 
eighties. Such is the case of the people from Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia and central 
America who sought and found asylum in other Latin American countries.  
In effect, dictatorships and authoritarian regimes tend to be very suspicious of emigration 
by their citizens and also of foreigners coming in. One common practice is to deport the 
dissidents and then shut the gates. This way the situation tends to calm down and both departures 
and arrivals are restricted. Leaving the case of Cuba which is an extreme example, the 
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Dominican Republic provides a paradigmatic case. During the dictatorship of Trujillo, any 
possibility of emigrating was virtually shut down and the political police directly controlled the 
issue of passports (Gardiner, 1979). In the case of Chile, during the dictatorship of Pinochet, 
around 200 people fled and the foreign population diminished from 90,441 people in 1970 to 
84,345 in 1982. Dictatorships tend to emphasize domestic control of the population and justify 
their migration policies with arguments of national security (Mármora, 1987).    
 The pattern of migrations to cities within the region from rural areas, or by the urban 
populace, is of an established rather than temporary type like border migration; and it is a 
migration over greater distances, to places far from the point of origin, something that makes 
returning difficult. These migrants go into a secondary labor market: as domestic servants, taking 
care of the elderly, cleaning jobs, building, maquila, services and informal commerce; another 
feature is the tendency to develop ethnic economies, in streets, zones or neighborhoods with 
national identities; finally, they appropriate particular niches or labor spaces. Such is the case of 
the Peruvian “nannies” in domestic service who go to Santiago de Chile; as it is of the Peruvians 
and Paraguayans who work in the building trade in Buenos Aires, Argentina;  the Colombians in 
the Caracas textile industry; the Nicaraguan pickers who go to San José de Costa Rica and the 
Dominicans who work in cutting cane in Puerto Rico. (Duany, 1995; Grasmuck and Pessar, 
1991; Cardona, 1983; Rosero, 2002; Sassone, et al., 2004).  
The case of Argentina is perhaps the most relevant because of its age and diversity. 
People from Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia and more recently Peru, have a significant presence in 
various cities, but most especially in Buenos Aires, where indeed they have neighborhoods with 
a high degree of ethnic concentration on the basis of national origins   (Vior, 2006; Bertone de 
Daguerre, 2003, Vargas, 2005, Sassone, 2004). In the case of Caracas, Venezuela, intra-regional 
migration was important in the eighties, in particular that of Colombians and Ecuatorians, but it 
ceased to be a pole of attraction at the end of the twentieth century. To the contrary, the 
emigration of high and middle sectors for political reasons has commenced.    
Intra-regional migrations have the peculiarity of being closely linked to the ups and 
downs of the economy and a complicated system of social networks, through which there is a 
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flow of information about the labor market. The bonanzas and economic crises of Argentina and 
Venezuela are matched by significant flows of migrants to and from neighboring countries. 
Migrant flows are also related to regional exchange rate differences. The dollarized economies of 
Ecuador and El Salvador and at certain times in Argentina, attract or repel migrants depending 
on the advantages and disadvantages of the exchange rate. Economic booms energize the 
construction and services sectors, which are both niches for migrant workers to come to. 
Information flows not only through the press but also across social networks of migrants, who 
have the capacity to moderate or encourage the flow depending on circumstances. The 
construction industry tends to emply contractors or gang leaders who run teams of workers of the 
same nationality, which is how Mexicans work in the United States, Paraguayans and Bolivians 
in Argentina, Peruvians in Chile, and Nicaraguans in Costa Rica (Massey, et al., 1987; Vargas, 
2005).   
During the first decade of the twenty-first century, intra-regional migration in Latin 
America is a delimited process that is significant in very few countries. Currently the most 
extreme example is that of Costa Rica, where the foreign population from Nicaragua amounted 
to 7% of the total and represented 70% of the foreign population (Rosero, 2002). In Argentina 
the foreign population amounted to 4.2% of the total, and intra-regional migration from Chile, 
Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru accounted for 2.8%.  In Chile, immigration is a very recent process 
and the foreign population account for just 1.2% of the total; of these 26 % are from Argentina, 
20.5% from Peru, 6% from Bolivia and 5.1% from Ecuador, with 42% from other countries 
(MPI, Data Hub, 2008).   
Today intra-regional migration in Latin America has been facilitated considerably by the 
liberalization of migration requirements, as a direct consequence of processes of economic 
integration through MERCOSUR, la Comunidad Andina, el CARICOM, the free trade 
agreements in Central America and the recent Unión de Naciones Sudamericanas, UNASUR, 
promoted by Brazil in 2008.   
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Migration in transit  
A third modality of intra-regional migration is of persons who are in transit.  This is a relatively 
recent phenomenon and is directly related to the flows of migrants headed for the United States 
who use the Mexican border as a way in. The border is over 3,000 kilometers long, and has 
always been used by undocumented migrants as their way to get in. However, in recent years the 
process has become massive with migrants not only from Mexico but also from Central America, 
the Caribbean, South America and different parts of the world joining in.    
 Colloquially it is said that the U.S. border has come down from the Rio Bravo to the Rio 
Suchiate between Mexico and Guatemala. And there is some sense in the remark, as Mexico’s 
restrictive policies with regard to the majority of Latin American countries, are basically aimed 
at stopping the in-transit migration heading for the United States. In the year 2005 the National 
Migration Institute, Instituto Nacional de Migración (INM) of Mexico reported the number of 
people who were detained, apprehended or deported for having entered into the country without 
papers as 240,695, of whom the vast majority (94%) came from Central America (Guatemala, 
Honduras and El Salvador). However, according to the census for 2000 the number of Central 
Americans living in the country legally was only  40,436. So the number of Central Americans 
circulating through Mexico is 5 times greater than the number of those that have a residence. Not 
counting the migrants who cross without being caught.  
 At any rate, the highest point for transit migration in ten years is marked by the year 
2005. Since then, the number of undocumented migrants detained has fallen significantly, and in 
2008 the total was 94,891 people. Central Americans continue to be the primary source of in-
transit migrants, but the volume is considerably reduced.  The only country increasing the 
number of migrants in transit to any great extent is Cuba. In the case of Cuba, a change in the 
route taken by undocumented migration has been  noted, as easy access to the coast of Mexico 
allows migrants to then head for the United Staes and ask for asylum. Asylum is granted to them 
widely and generously. In 2008 there were 2614 cases of Cubans being detained. 
There is a clear tendency for in-transit migration to be decreasing, according to reports 
from the INM, but the same tendency is also reflected in the figures reported by the United States 
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for Mexicans, Central Americans and South Americans deported between 2005 and 2007. The 
number of citizens from  El Salvador and Honduras deported has come down to practically half, 
and for South America the reduction is much greater as the number of people from there 
deported by the U.S. has come down from 38,140 in 2005 to 8,672 in 2007.  
This tendency for the numbers to reduce is due to several factors: a saturation of job 
offers in some areas of the labor market, migration restrictions on granting visas, border controls, 
a mood of hostility to migrants and raids on undocumented workers. In 2008 the economic crises 
pushes the tendency even further down. What is more, the main countries providing migrants in 
transit (Guatemala and Honduras, and El Salvador) are small and have in fact expelled a large 
part of their population. It was estimated that by the year 2000, 14% of the population of El 
Salvador were living abroad. By the same year, it was reckoned that 4.7% of the population of 
Guatemala and Honduras had gone to live abroad. There are no estimates for 2008 but the 
tendency has definitely been upwards (Solimano, 2008; Acosta et al., 2006).  
 Finally one should consider that Central American countries are themselves also transit 
countries, especially Guatemala, which is crossed by migrants from neighboring countries and 
also receives migrants from South America and other parts of the world hoping to reach the 
United States by crossing the border with Mexico.    
4.- South-North migration process 
 South-North migration tends to be referred to in the literature in terms of hemispheres 
rather than geographically, with the aim of stressing the asymmetry of the relation between the 
developed industrialized nations, generally found in the north and the poor developing countries 
that are usually in the south (Zolberg, 1999; Portes, 2007).  
According to this definition, the emigration of Latin Americans to Japan might be 
considered a South-North migration. However, for the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
the choice of this term is not the most adequate, as it makes the subject more complicated, makes 
analysis more difficult and does not correspond to historical and geographical reality. Applying 
the same criterion to the history of transoceanic immigration into Latin America from Europe, 
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the process would have to be considered South-North, i.e. from less developed to more 
developed countries. In the case of Latin America, the dynamics of South-North migration are 
established, historically and geographically, in the context of the dependence, domination, 
disparity and attraction exercised by the United States over the whole region. Emigration to the 
United States is a historical process generalized throughout the region, with a large tradition and 
on a massive scale. In this sense, there are a number of factors that distinguish the South-North 
process from more recent migration flows destined for Europe, Japan and other industrialized 
nations, that we would prefer to call transoceanic migrations.  
Other scholars refer to migration directed to OECD countries, but Mexico, the principal 
country exporting labor, is itself a member of the OECD (Solimano, 2008). In fact Latin 
American emigration in all these cases is directed to countries with a very high index of human 
development; for example, Canada which comes fourth, Japan (8), U.S.A. (15), Spain (16), Italy 
(19) and Portugal (33). The same is also true of intra-regional migration, where the principal 
destinations are countries with a high rating for human development like Chile (40), Argentina 
(46) and Costa Rica (50). However, there are also countries with a high human development 
rating that produce significant migrant flows, such as Cuba (48), Mexico (51), Trinidad and 
Tobago (57), Panama (58) and Ecuador (72). 
 The South-North migration process involves both the United States and Canada,  the two 
countries with the highest human development ratings, but there are significant differences 
between them. While nearly half of the foreign population in the United States  (48.5%) is 
accounted for by Latin American migration, the Latin population in Canada amount to less than 
3% of immigrants. In other words, the Latin Americans are the most significant group of 
migrants and larger than any other group in the United States, which gives them great economic, 
political and cultural weight. Quite the reverse in Canada, where they are a small minority, and 
the largest group of migrants is that of those from Mexico but only represents 0.75% of all 
foreigners, followed by those from El Salvador (0.69%) and Chile (0.44%), many of whom came 
in as refugees in the seventies and eighties (MPI, Global Data, 2008a; MPI, Data HUB, 2008; 
Pew Hispanic Center, 2008; García, 2006). 
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There is plenty of information on Latin American migration to the United States, but the 
data needs to be handled carefully, because different population categories are used: by 
generation, by racial classification, by legal situation. The best statistical information in the 
United States refers to Hispanics and not exactly to Latin Americans, and excludes many 
Caribbean countries where Spanish is not the main language. It is possible to get information on 
Hispanics for the year 2006, but to get information for the whole of Latin America, it is 
necessary to go to the census of 2000. Due to this peculiarity, information analyzed in the text 
will be on Hispanics, and general information for the whole of Latin America will be included in 
the Statistical addendum.  
It was estimated for the year 2006 that the migrant population of the United States born in 
Latin America and the Hispanic West Indies, amounted to 23.4 million people. Mexican 
migrants come in first with 11.5 million, followed by Puerto Ricans at 3.9 million, Salvadorans 
at 1 million, Cubans at 932 thousand, Dominicans at 764 thousand and Colombians at 589 
thousand. It is striking that El Salvador should have more migrants than Cuba and the Dominican 
Republic. However, the regional structure remains unchanged, with Mexico at the head followed 
by the Caribbean, then Central America and finally South America, which grows at a slower rate 
of growth as a region migrants come from, because of the greater range of destinations they 
choose to go to.    
Table 5. Latin American migrant population (born abroad), by region, in the U S, 2006 
Region  Year 2006 
Mexico  11,534,972 
Hispanic West Indies  6,725,448 
Central America   2,669,558 
South America  2,499,467 
Total  23,429,445 
Sources: Pew Hispanic Center, 2008, based on the 2000 census and the American Community 
Survey, 2006. The figure for the Caribbean is our own, as it is limited to the Hispanic West 
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Indies, and is based on the data of the PHC for Cuba and the Dominican Republic and census 
data for Puerto Rico.     
 With respect to the Caribbean population not included in the sub-group of Hispanics three 
cases should be noted. In 1970 the U.S. census registered 28,026 Haitians and in the year 2000, 
counted 419,317. A similar process is observed for Jamaica, with 68,576 in 1970 and 553,827 in 
the year 2000. Finally, it is necessary to point out the case of Trinidad and Tobago, which 
reported 20,673 in 1970, and 197,398 in the year 2000. For the other Caribbean Islands though 
there was an increase in the number of emigrants, the figures are much lower. Migration to the 
United States from the Caribbean region in general, not counting Puerto Rico, grew at an 
acclerating pace, from 1,803,970 immigrants in 1970 to 16,086,974 in the year 2000 (Census 
Bureau, 1970 and 2000). 
When we consider the growth of the Hispanic-Latin population in the United States in the 
last four decades, it has been startling. Between 1960 and 2000 the number of people of Latin 
American origin multiplied fivefold, from 6.9 million to 35.3. Apart from the remarkable 
increase in the numbers in absolute terms, symbolically the most relevant change is that they 
became the largest minority in the U.S.A., just above the Afro-American population, according 
to the 2000 census. Six years later the gap has widened, with the Latin population reaching 44.3 
million, or 14.8 % of the total, while the number of Afro-Americans has virtually stood still at 
12.2% of the total (Pew Hispanic Center, 2008). The Latin population has the highest growth rate 
in the United States, as it increases both by natural growth and through migration, and it is 
estimated that by 2050 it will be above 100 million and will be the second largest concentration 
of Spanish speaking people in the world. All the same, one should be careful with such 
projections, as there are clear signs that Latin American migration to the U.S. reached its peak in 
2005 and a decrease in the volume of the flow has started to be observed. The postponement of a 
migratory reform and the financial and economic crisis of 2008 have further encouraged this 
tendency. Finally, the thesis of a migration hump has begun to be clearly demonstrated for the 
case of Latin America.       
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With regard to estimates of the undocumented migrant population, Latin Americans are 
in a large majority. According to Passel (2005), 81% of the undocumented population come from 
Latin America. Most of them were from Mexico (57%) and the rest (24%) from other Latin 
American countries.3 As well as being numerous, the migration processes that feed the Latin 
community in the United States are very heterogeneous and diverse. Evey country has its history, 
its peculiarities and its own rhythms.     
Since the end of the nineteenth century, the dominant national group in the Latin 
community has been Mexico, due to the particular historical and geographical relation with its 
neighbour in the north. The 2000 census reported that were 20.6 million Latins of Mexican 
origin, 58.5 per cent of all the Latin population. A particular feature of the Mexican population in 
the United States has been the ambivalence of its legal condition, with two significant groups: 
the legal and the undocumented (Massey et al., 2002) 
 The Caribbean hispanics come second and in the year 2000 accounted for 15.3% of the 
total Latin population. The migration process developed in the Caribbean in different stages. It 
started with the emigration of Puerto Rican workers after the Second World War, in response to 
an aggressive recruitment program; this was followed by a massive influx of Cuban refugees in 
the sixties and seventies, and, finally, there was the immigration of Dominican workers in the 
seventies, eighties and nineties. It should be mentioned that there are significant differences with 
regard to the legal condition of migration flows. The Puerto Ricans arrive as citizens, the Cubans 
as refugees, and the Dominicans as immigrants, with or without papers (Duany, 1995; Grasmuck 
y Pessar, 1991; Pedraza, 2007).   
The number coming from Central America amounted to 4.8%  of foreigners in the U.S.A. 
in 2000 and their history is from a later period, from the eighties. The civil wars in Nicaragua 
(1976-1979), El Salvador (1979-1991) and Guatemala (1980-1996) detonated intense migration 
processes to the United States. Later the crisis deriving from the passage of hurricanes in 
                                                            
3 Passel has developed a special methodology for estimating the undocumented population, using the 
ten-year censuses, the Current Population Survey, figures for births and deaths and legal migration, 
which includes a sector of undocumented. It is an indirect measure based on demographic methods that 
are widely recognized in the academic world. Passel is considered the top specialist in this kind of 
demographic analysis.   
22 
 
Honduras (specifically Mitch in 1998) encouraged and facilitated the flow of migrants from this 
nation as environmental refugees. The contribution by people from Central American countries 
to the Latin American population of the U.S.A. is uneven. The most important nations are El 
Salvador and Guatemala, followed by Honduras and to a lesser extent by Nicaragua, Panama and 
Costa Rica (Hamilton and Stoltz, 2001; Menjivar, 2000).  
Finally, the members of the Latin American population coming from South America 
amount to 3.8% of the total and have a more recent history. Although the original migrations go 
back to the sixties, the wave of migration only really gets started at the end of the twentieth 
century, especially in the eighties and nineties when Colombia got above the half million mark 
and Ecuador and Peru tripled their numbers in just two decades.  When the process started in the 
fifties and sixties, Latin Americans could easily get residence visas, then they applied through 
the quota system and finally came in on the grounds of reuniting families (Reimers, 1992). In 
other cases, migrants from South America came in on tourist visas and overextended their stay 
(Altamirano, 1992 and 1996; Cardona et al. 1980). Finally, in special situations, when there are 
specific needs for determined niches in the labor market, they are granted special (H2) visas, as 
in the case of temporary immigrants of Mexican origin who work in agriculture and services 
(80,000) and that of the nearly 3000 Peruvians of indigenous origin, who work as shepherds in 
the West of the United States  (Paerregaard, 2005).  
On the East coast there is significant immigration from the Caribbean, coming in from 
Haiti and Jamaica. For many years Haitians and Jamaicans were recruited to work in cutting 
sugar cane in Florida. Many of them came with H2A visas, only for temporary agricultural labor. 
In due course with the mechanization of sugar cane harvesting and the urban and hotel 
development of Florida they went on to work in services. Jamaicans also go to Canada, under a 
temporary worker scheme, but the major flow of emigration from Jamaica goes to the United 
Kingdom. The total size of the Jamaican diaspora is estimated to be of 680,000, which amounts 
to 26.4 % of the country’s population (Solimano, 2008). With respect to Haiti, it has a significant 
diaspora around the world, which comes to over half a million people and represents 6.4 % of the 
population (ibid.). The main destinations are the Dominican Republic and the United States.  
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Summing up, the South-North migration is definitely the most important for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, because of its size, and also because of its age, the impact it has on 
the destination society and the amount of remittances it generates to send back. On a regional 
scale, South-North migration is especially important for Mexico and Central America, as the 
flows are only to one destination, while South America and the Caribbean, excluding Puerto 
Rico, have a greater diversification in destinations.  
Three cases may be regarded as extreme: that of Mexico, that of Puerto Rico and that of 
El Salvador. The Mexican case is exceptional because of its size: more than 11 million 
immigrants were born in Mexico; but also for its legal impact on the destination society where it 
has an undocumented population of around 6 million people, and a particular weight among the 
Hispanic-Latin population, of whom 20.6 million are of Mexican origin.  Further, the impact of 
this process on Mexico is relevant as  10.5 % of the population live abroad and the country 
receives over 24,000 million dollars a year in remittances. It is however difficult to compare the 
Mexican case with those of other countries in Latin America because of its proximity to the 
United States, the age and the size of the migration process and its particular historical relations 
with the Nortehrn neighbor (Durand and Massey, 2003; Massey et al., 2002).      
Puerto Rico is even more of an exception, because of its status as a “freely associated 
country”, which is quite difficult to understand and explain, but in historical and sociological 
terms amounts to the relationship of a colony. Puerto Rico’s exceptionality has three 
characteristics: citizens of Puerto Rico have an American passport, Puerto Rico is poorer than 
any state of the Union and  50.5 % of her population live on the mainland, an impressive figure 
but one that needs qualifying (Duany, 2002). Puerto Rican migration may be considered 
international if Puerto Rico is thought of as being part of Latin America, and it can be considered 
domestic if the island is considered part of the United States, in which case the figure is not 
exceptional, as a number of States have over 50% of their population living in other parts of the 
country.    
El Salvador may also be considered an extreme case because a large part of the 
population (14.5 %) lives outside the country (Pellegrino, 2001, Solimano, 2008). From our point 
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of view when over 10% of the population lives abroad this should be regarded as a case of mass 
migration. Excluding the special case of Puerto Rico, El Salvador is the country with the most 
intense rate of emigration in Latin America. Yet even these numbers fade when we look at the 
situation in the Caribbean, where the general rate of emigration reaches 14.5% of the population, 
which is four times the rate for Latin America of 3.5%. Some of the Caribbean cases have 
extremely large proportions of the population emigrating; for example Granada, where 69.1% of 
the population live abroad, in the Dutch Antilles  54.9%, in Surinam 43.8% and in Guyana 
41.0% (Solimano, 2008).    
In addition to migration to Europe, an important flow has been developed to Japan. 
Strictly speaking it is a flow back as it consists of a second and a third generation of Japanese 
migrants who came to Brazil, Peru, Bolivia and other countries earlier on. It is estimated that in 
Japan there are some 300,000 migrants from Brazil and 90,000 from Peru. In spite of the 
common cultural origins and similar phenotype, there are important difficulties for these groups 
to integrate (Takenaka, 2005). 
In the case of the Brazilian nikkeis, their use of the language is not perfect, even though 
they spoke Japanese at home and went to Japanese schools, and this makes them objects of 
discrimination. Furthermore, their idea of the body is completely different, as in Brazilian culture 
it is something to be displayed, while in Japanese culture it is to be concealed.   
As a matter of fact, even in the case of the children and grandchildren of Spanish 
emigrants, they find problems of cultural adaptation and of discrimination when they return to 
live in Spain. Certainly knowing the language makes adaptation easier, but integration has not 
been easy; especially in regions of Spain with a very strong regional sense of identity.    
5.- The impact of migration on human development 
The impact of migration on communities at the receiving end is a subject that has been widely 
treated in the academic world. Processes of integration and assimilation have been studied 
systematically, since the Chicago School marked the lines of research and methodological 
approaches at the beginning of the twentieth century (Burgess, 1926; Park, 1921, 1922; Palmer, 
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1928).  The impact of migration on the places emigrated from has been studied less, but since the 
twenties, the impact of remittances sent back from abroad has been of academic interest.  The 
work of Manuel Gamio, on the amount sent in remittances back to Mexico in the twenties, was a 
pioneering study (Gamio, 1930).  
 In Latin America more attention was given to analyzing the impact of internal (rural-
urban) migration on capitals and big cities. The formation of barriadas, favelas, popular 
settlements and belts of misery around Latin American cities was a permanent concern for social 
scientists. Urbanization, for the most part irregular, questioned the right to land use, ownership, 
municipal regulations and access to services. The seventies and eighties were very intense for 
urban growth and urban popular movements demanding the regularization of land and access to 
services. The over-supply of labor in Latin American cities generated intense processes of 
tertiarization and informal work (Alonso, 1980; Durand, 1983; Matos Mar, 1968; Hardoy and 
Schaedel, 1976).  
Internal migration led to international emigration. Those among the poor who had found 
better work, health and education opportunities in the cities proceeded to settle definitely. Unlike 
these, middle and lower middle class sectors that had started to feel the crisis considered the 
option of international migration. When emigration from Latin America increased abruptly at the 
end of the twentieth century, and the range of destinations was widened, the subject of 
remittances became the focus of attention once more. Analysis at local level can be separated 
into studies emphasizing the negative impact of migration (Wiest, 1983, 1984;  Dinerman, 1988;  
Bindford, 2002 ) and those that relativized that position and expressed their opinion that there 
were also positive impacts and that a small but relevant proportion (8%) of remittances was 
dedicated to productive investments, broadly speaking (Durand, 1988 ; Durand, Parrado and 
Massey  1996; Jones, 1998 ).  
Later, the remarkable increase in remittances at world level, especially from Latin 
Americans, caught the attention of analysts at the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank, and they tried to establish a connection between remittances and 
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development. The remarkable increase in remittances to developing nations in the form of money 
sent to families, might be channeled somehow into productive projects (Banco Mundial, 2008).  
According to World Bank figures, Latin America and the Caribbean received around 61 
billion dollars in 2007 in the form of remittances, giving the region first place in the world, 
followed closely by the Asia-Pacific region (58 billion). The figure shows that LAC countries 
were receiving about a quarter of all remittances in the world  (24.3%).  
At the same time Mexico is third in the world as receiver of remittances (25 billion in 
2007) a little below India (27 billion) and China (25.7 billion). Nevertheless, the Bank of Mexico 
has reported a drop of 4.2% in remittances received in 2008, due to the economic problems of 
the United States, the mortgage crisis there, increasing unemployment, especially in construction 
and services, and the restrictive measures both inside the United States (raids) and at the border. 
The recession in the United States will have a very severe impact on certain regions of Latin 
America, where a markedly one-direction migration pattern had developed, as in several 
countries of meso-America and the Caribbean. On the other hand in South America there is a 
pattern of much more diversified destinations which to some extent will make it possible to bear 
the impact of the global crisis better (Banco Mundial, 2008). 
 In many countries the economic impact of remittances is on the regional level, and is 
concentrated basically on the communities used to exporting labor abroad. There are also large 
differences in the amounts of money sent, depending on the destination the migrants send them 
from. Remittances in dollars and euros are considerably greater than those coming from intra-
regional migration, which have a much smaller impact. Such is the case, for example, of 
Nicaragua, where the vast majority of migrants go to Costa Rica, while El Salvador gets 
remittances in dollars. Similar examples are provided by Paraguay and Bolivia with respect to 
Argentina, and Haiti with respect to the Dominican Republic.    
At any rate, the impact of remittances is much greater in the poorest countries of   LAC 
where income from remittances is an important slice of GDP. According to figures from the 
World Bank (2007), four Latin American countries are among the ten in the world with the 
largest proportion of GDP provided by remittances. The relation between remittances and GDP 
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in Honduras is 24.5%, in Guyana it is 23.5%, in Haiti, 20%, and in Jamaica, 19.4 %. The cases of 
El Salvador and Guatemala are also significant but to a lesser extent (World Bank, 2007).  
In recent years it has been debated in international forums whether remittances might not 
make a considerable contribution to generating development. In the year 2004 remittances 
accounted for 70% of direct foreign investment (DFI) and this sum represented 500% more than 
the support provided by international aid organizations. Between 2004 and 2007 remittances 
grew at an annual rate of close to 15% (World Bank, 2008). But in 2008 the pace at which 
remittances increased appears to have stopped. Under the current conditions of the world 
economy, more foreign investment in the region is not foreseen, and much less any larger 
international subsidies for developing nations.  Any help will serve to alleviate somewhat the 
effects of the crisis, rather than necessarily generating development.   
Anyway, the empirical facts cannot be evaded. Mexico has received remittances 
consistently for over a century. Also the Dominican Republic has been receiving them for over 
half a century. In neither case can it be said that remittances have had a significant effect on the 
development of the country. According to Solimano (2008), remittances have little effect on 
reducing poverty, as they only reduced the poverty rate by 1.4 % and extreme poverty 
(indigence) by 1.5%. On the other hand it is known that extremely poor sectors do not tend to 
emigrate as much as sectors that do have some resources.   
Information obtained from observation in the field allows us to state that remittances have 
had an effect on the family and even on the regional scale, generating improved welfare and 
better living conditions for the families of migrants. In these concrete examples, there has been a 
direct impact on the diet, housing, education and health of families receiving remittances. In the 
eight countries where the Latin American Migration Project has conducted research it has been 
possible to determine that the families of migrants have better domestic installations, which 
results in greater well being and better opportunities for human development. To have electricity, 
drinking water, sewerage, a refrigerator, an automobile, a telephone or the internet does not only 
improve daily living conditions, it allows children to do better at school, makes it possible for 
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food to be prepared in more hygienic conditions, and provides improved resources for dealing 
with effects of the weather (LAMP, 2008). 
There is no doubt that the first impact of remittances is on improving the living 
conditions of migrants and their families, and they have a direct effect on mitigating the wants of 
a large sector of the migrant population. On a second level, the impact can be appreciated 
directly in the education projects of families, and improved conditions of access to health and 
housing. A third effect has to do with the creation of employment. There is a sector of migrants 
that is able to save, and upon return is capable of generating self-employment or employment for 
the family. Far less common are examples of jobs being created through small and medium sized 
firms. A small firm does in fact have a considerable effect if installed in one of the communities 
of origin. There is a place in Zacatecas, in Mexico, for example, where a migrant set up a 
roadside restaurant employing 40 of people from the locality and is now the company generating 
the most employment in the community. Finally one should consider the multiplying effects of 
remittances on the local, regional and national economies. As most of the money is spent on 
consumption, it definitely provides direct support to the development of the domestic market. 
This impact can be seen, for example, in the building trade at local and popular levels (Durand, 
2003;  Espinosa, 1998;   Durand, Massey and Parrado, 1996). 
Obviously remittances also have impacts that may be described as negative. A number of 
scholars have pointed out that remittances are a fundamental cause of social differentiation 
within many rural communities. These generate inequality and at the same time greater 
expectations which result in more migration (Bindford, 2002).  
They may also have a differential or ambivalent impact. In some cases remittances have 
generated intense urbanization processes and the development of local infrastructure while in 
others migration has been the principal cause of depopulation and the gradual abandonment of 
investments and of the possibility of investing in the community (Durand, 1988). As we said, 
remittances can generate processes of social differentiation and encourage individualism and 
abandoning the community, and also there are many cases of individuals contributing to the 
development of the community, for example with social remittances and the help given by 
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migrants to infrastructure in their communities and the organization of various cultural activities 
and civic and religious festivities (Fernández, 1988). This collective side of remittances has been 
most developed and promoted in Mexico with the 3x1 Program (Moctezuma, 2005).4 
The impact of remittances is differentiated according to space and according to time. The 
causes and the conditions for success or failure in the investment of remittances in family or 
productive projects can vary significantly depending on local conditions, infrastructure, political 
and economic conjunctures and the windows of opportunity or the lack of any.  
 All the same if one had to make a balance of the positive and negative aspects of 
remittances in Latin America, I consider the positive aspects to have much more weight as they 
improve the human development ratings of communities, families of migrants and individual 
migrants. Migrants invest their remittances in nutrition, clothing, housing, education and health. 
The impact on the level of human development is considerable. Even if only invested in 
nutrition, clothing and housing, they still manage to have a big impact on family health and the 
education of the children.       
Apart from remittances migration has other costs and benefits for receiving countries as 
well as for countries of origin that should be taken into account. In Latin America we can 
distinguish two different patterns at regional level that have to do with the educational level of 
the migrants. In Meso-America and the Caribbean, migration is basically by popular and rural 
(peasant) sectors, while in South America, migrants tend to be from middle class and lower 
middle class sectors, who definitely have better standards of education.    
In Latin America the topic of a brain drain is not as big as in other regions, especially 
Africa and Asia. Neither does it have the same level of return that China takes particular 
advantage of in getting its citizens educated abroad (Cohen, 2008). In the case of Taiwan the loss 
of human capital which left to be educated abroad lasted for several decades, but without 
reducing the country’s growth and development rates. While Asia gets 64% of the United States 
                                                            
4 The 3x1 Program encorages the participation of organized migrants who contribute a little something to 
infrastructure works and the municipal, state and federal governments add their bit. Many projects in the 
communities of migrants have been financed in this way.    
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H1B visas, the number given to immigrants from South America qualified in computer systems 
accounts for only 6.4%, some 12,000 jobs of work (Solimano, 2008). 
It is in the very poor countries without options that the brain drain has a strong impact. In 
the Caribbean there are situations like those lived in Africa, and practically all the small islands 
are losing professionals. In the case of Haiti and that of Jamaica, 8 out of 10 professionals live 
abroad. Panama also has a high rate, of 57.7, and Venezuela, with a rate of 60.1, is losing 
professionals at an accelerating rate because of the political situation. The case of Cuba is 
different as many professionals seek asylum abroad but the country has a specific policy of 
exporting professionals to several countries in Latin America under bilateral agreements.    
 In countries such as Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, the impact of the brain drain is not 
very striking but does leave a significant vacuum. In the case of Mexico for example, it is 
reckoned that around 6,000 professionals with PhDs, work outside the country. If this group 
were to return to Mexico to teach in universities or work in industry, it would certainly make a 
significant contribution to the development of the nation. The opposite happened in the forties 
when Spanish intellectuals came over as refugees, and in the seventies with the arrival of Latin 
American left-wing intellectuals. In both cases their contributions to knowledge, culture and 
science were fundamental. According to CONACYT, 5% of those awarded grants in Mexico to 
study doctorates abroad do not come back  (La Jornada, 17 de abril de 2007).   
6.- Migration policies in Latin America and the Caribbean 
          In Latin America there has been a great turnaround in migration policies. Following the 
second World War, and to some extent reflecting the economic model of import substitution, 
countries closed their doors to foreign products and obstructed the passage of people. There were 
obviously exceptions to this policy. The clearest examples are Argentina and Venezuela which 
had an open door policy to immigration from Latin America. Both cases led to a growth in the 
numbers of undocumented people and  subsequent regularization procedures.   
 With regard to emigration, the policy in nearly all countries of the region was one of free 
passage. The exceptions would be related to periods of dictatorships. In the case of Cuba, which 
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may be considered an extreme example, it has been very difficult to get permission to leave for 
half a century or more.   
 In the nineties and in relation to the trade openings and free trade agreements in Latin 
America (Mercosur, Comunidad Andina, Sistema de Integración Centro Americano SICA and 
the Caribbean Community CARICOM, also the Plan Puebla Panamá)  free transit between 
member states is facilitated. Except when there are conjunctional problems or conflicts between 
countries, in South America it is possible to travel freely without visa and even without passport. 
Only a national I.D. of some kind is required. In Central America, the CA4 agreement permits 
free transit between Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador.  
 Exceptions to free transit in Latin America are few. In the Caribbean, Puerto Rico applies 
the U.S. policy which is very restrictive. In Mexico a double standard is used to cover migrants 
in transit and the drug trade. Citizens of all those countries that send either migrants or narcotics 
to Mexico on their way to the United States, must have a visa; thus the countries that do not need 
a visa are Argentina, Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela. Finally in Costa Rica, citizens 
of Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru, the Dominican Republic and Colombia must have a visa, but here 
there is an exception: “visa not required if a valid USA one is held” (no necesitan visa si tienen 
válida de EUA). It may be appreciated that the restrictive policies in Latin America tend to have 
a connection with US migration policy, especially in the Meso-American area which is a corridor 
for the passage of immigrants and shipments of drugs headed for the United States.   
 In conclusion one may assert that in Latin America there is a clear tendency to free 
circulation, and indeed the movement of people is seen as a fundamental element in the 
development of the region. Quite the opposite in North America, where Mexico, the United 
States, Puerto Rico and Canada consider migration to be an element that has to be controlled and 
restricted. It is obvious that Mexico and Puerto Rico are places where the transit of 
undocumented migrants has substantially increased. While the United States and Canada are 
countries regarded by migrants as final destinations.  
 In Europe we observe a tendency to unite restrictive policies against Latin American 
migrants. Spain, Italy and Portugal, which had been quite open to immigration from Latin 
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America and thr Caribbean have started to impose certain restrictions on free transit. The 
countries with the greatest restrictions on travelling to Europe are Colombia, Belize, Barbados, 
Cuba, Haiti, Ecuador, Jamaica, Panama, Peru, the Dominican Republic and Trinidad and 
Tobago. In most of these cases there are substantial immigrant communities of their citizens 
living in Europe. In general in Europe if the flows of migrants are not very large, there is an open 
borders policy with LAC countries.  
 In the Far East the most relevant case is that of Japan, which opened its doors in the 
eighties to immigration by the descendants of Japanese people, known as Nikkei’s, who were 
living in Latin America. It was mainly the Nikkei of Peru and Brazil who opted to emigrate back 
to the land of their ancestors. However, to go to Japan as tourists, Peruvians and Brazilians need 
a visa, just like the Cubans, Dominicans, Ecuatorians, Haitians, Jamaicans, Nicaraguans and 
Panamanians.  
 Citizens of Latin America and the Caribbean can move with considerable ease in the 
subcontinent, but most countries have restrictions on travel to North America and just a few on 
travelling to Europe. In South America the countries with the greatest restrictions are Colombia, 
Ecuador and Peru. In Central America there are restrictions on travel to the United States and 
Canada, but citizens can travel freely to other continents. In the Caribbean there are restrictions 
on travel to the United States, Canada and Europe for most countries, except for Puerto Rico. 
The countries with the greatest opportunities for establishing relations and moving freely are the 
largest and those with a relaxed economy and a higher human development rating such as Chile 
(40) Argentina (47), Uruguay (47), Costa Rica (50) and Mexico (51).   
 Visa requirements are not only restrictions on certain nationalities but also limit access by 
certain social sectors. Middle and upper class people tend not to have serious problems with 
travelling and moving around the whole world, but those who cannot prove they have permanent 
employment, economic resources and property, are systematically excluded. This policy explains 
in part why a wide sector of undocumented migration tends to be from the popular classes.    
 The largest contingent of undocumented migrants in the United States is made up 
of Latin Americans. According to the estimates of Passel (2005), 81% of undocumented 
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migrants are of Latin American origin. Of these over half come from Mexico. The 
undocumented flow of migrants from Mexico to the United States has been going on for a long 
time, it may be said for over a century. There is a close relation between the market for cheap 
labor in the United States, and particular regions in Mexico.  The passage of workers without 
papers has historically been allowed, occasionally encouraged and at certain times repressed. The 
most relevant example historically is that of agriculture. At present more than 80% of 
agricultural workers in the United States were born in Mexico, another 5% are of Mexican 
background and nearly 60% of the total are without papers. In this sense the relation is one of 
mutual dependence (Durand and Massey, 2003). However, Mexican migration has gone on into 
other markets, such as services, the poultry industry and manufacturing.  
Table 6.- Unauthorized migrants from Latin America  
 
Source: Pew Hispanic Center, 2005. Estimates elaborated by J. Passel 
The number of immigrants without papers has increased significantly largely due to the 
migration policy of the United States which has broken off the migration pattern of coming and 
leaving that had worked for around a hundred years. Currently undocumented migrants do not go 
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back as they used to until the nineteen nineties. The dissuasive border policy applied against 
migrants since 1993 has increased the costs and the dangers of surreptitious migration tenfold, 
which prevents the migrant who has managed to cross the border from going back again. In the 
1986 the cost of crossing the border with a coyote guide was USD $200, in 2008 it cost USD 
$3,000. Further, the number of people who die crossing the border has gone up from 241 in 1998 
to 472 in 2005 (Fieldman and Durand, 2008).  
The last time undocumented migrants were regularized was in 1986, 22 years ago writing 
today, which means a good number of migrants have been living as such for 15 to 20 years and 
have been forced to bring their families over without permission. In the eighties undocumented 
Mexican migration was added to by that coming from the region of Central America and in the 
nineties accentuated by that of people from South America, especially originating from 
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.  
 At any rate the tendency seems to be for the numbers to be coming down. According to 
estimates by the Pew Hispanic Center (2008) between the years 2000 and 2004 some 800,000 
undocumented migrants came to the United States every year. However in the period 2005-2008 
the number came down to 500,000 per annum. The number is expected to decrease in 2009 due 
to the economic crisis. Not only this, but the general volume of undocumented migrants in the 
country has come down from 12.4 million in 2007 to 11.9 in 2008 (The Pew Hispanic Center, 
2008). The figures for foreigners deported also corroborate this tendency, whether for the United 
States, country of destination or for Mexico, country of transit. According to official data of the 
DHS (2008), the number of people from Central America (including Mexico) deported in 2005 
was 1,093,382, along with 38,140 South Americans. In the year 2007 the number of Central 
Americans deported was  854,261, including the Mexicans, and the number from South America 
was 8,672. The same phenomenon is observed in transit migration passing through Mexico. 
According to figures from el Instituto Nacional de Migración (INAMI), the number of foreigners 
deported in 2005 was 240,269, mainly people from Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. And 
in 2008 the number deported was 94,891. Migration in transit from Central America has 
decreased to half. Only that of Cubans has increased, as they now use Mexico as the main and 
the safest route to get to the United States.     
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 Undocumented migrants in the United States and in Europe are in an extremely 
vulnerable situation. Not only because they may be subject to deportation at any time but 
because they have more difficulties than legal migrants in dealing with economic circumstances. 
According to the Pew Hispanic Center (2009) seven out of ten Latin Americans who used to 
send remittances have stated that they have had to reduce the amounts sent and the number of 
times they send them, because of the economic crisis.   Alongside which they have reduced 
certain practices drastically, such as eating out or going on vacations. Lastly, a quarter of the 
population interviewed (28%) say they have had to help a member of the family or a friend who 
was in a difficult economic situation.    
7.- Conclusions  
As the first decade of the twenty-first century begins to draw to a close, the contribution 
of Latin America and the Caribbean to international migration amounts to some 30 million 
people, or 15% of the estimated 191 million migrants worldwide. The migrants from Latin 
America and the Caribbean represent 5.5% of the population of the region, which is estimated to 
be 523 million. For the most part these migrants have chosen to migrate within the continent, 
with 23.5 million living in the United States and 3.5 million in various countries of the region. 
Additionally, in recent times they have been making their way to Europe where 2 million live 
and to Japan which has taken in just under half a million.5 A similar calculation is provided by 
Solimano (2008) who estimates the number of legal Latin American migrants living in OECD 
countries at 25 million.   
Estimates of undocumented migrants are a black box and they need to be analyzed for 
each concrete case and cannot be generalized. In many countries, census figures include 
undocumented migrants, as in the United States; in other countries, like Spain, municipal records 
include irregular migrants. On the whole figures for legal or recorded migrants underestimate the 
total number, as they do not account for all undocumented migrants. And yet figures given by the 
                                                            
5   Calculations for the Hispanic Caribbean are from Duany, 2008; for Mexico, Central America and South 
America from the Pew Hispanic Center, 2008; for world population figures, the information is in United 
Nations, 2008.                                                                                                                                                                   
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media, NGOs and political representatives tend to overestimate the number of undocumented 
migrants.   
Irregular migration is certainly a problem for migrants who are in this situation and for 
the countries receiving them. However, a different rod is seen to be used for judging or 
qualifying undocumented workers and the employers who contract and exploit them. In many 
rich developed nations the living conditions of the workers are not only questionable but 
unacceptable. The downside of the remittances is the austere life style of the migrants, 
overcrowding, interminable working hours, double shifts and obviously the hardest, most 
dangerous and most badly paid jobs. The vast majority of those who earn money for remittances 
are earning minimum wages. Which says a lot about the solidarity they show to the family and 
community of origin.   
Migration is willingly undertaken but in many cases it is also a necessity, a desperate 
search for a way out, an attempt to flee from the conditions of poverty, marginalization and 
overexploitation in the countries and regions of origin. If there is one thing the proposals of the 
PNUD and of those who treat the phenomenon of migration as an academic subject have in 
common it is the idea of the person as the central focus of interest, as it is in the end individual 
people who take the decision to migrate and in so doing exercise their sovereign right to make 
this choice.  At the same time, the decision is taken in the context of structural limitations, both 
in the countries of origin and in those receiving migrants.  
Latin America and the Caribbean have been marked by the migration flows of millions of 
people who came over from Europe, Africa, Asia, the Far East and the Middle East. The social, 
economical, political and cultural impact of migrations is already part and parcel of the identity 
of each country and of the region as a whole. The final balance, after more than a century of 
migration flows to the different countries of Latin America and the Caribbean is highly positive. 
One might even say that the processes of integration of many very different nationalities in Latin 
America have not only been smooth but exemplary. The attitude of immigrants and the ease with 
which they have adapted are surprising. Migrants of all races and cultures have integrated with 
amazing ease and the second generations have simply ceased to be isolated, segregated, 
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differentiated. With no great integration projects, education plans or astronomical investments, 
the children of immigrants from anywhere in the world have become citizens.  
But in spite of the strength and the vigor of mestizos in all Latin America, at the bottom 
of society there are still the indigenous and the black minorities. The blacks and the indigenous 
people are still the poorest and most discriminated against stratum as they have been since the 
conquest. The son of an Italian, Spanish or Japanese peasant can become President, but it would 
be hard for the son of a Black or Indigenous person to do so. Why is it, one wonders, that the 
poorest countries of Latin America have the largest proportions of indigenous people among 
their populations, and the lowest human development ratings: Bolivia (111), Honduras, (117), 
Guatemala (121). Why is Haiti so poor and why does it have a human development rating very 
close to that of most African countries (141) if it was the first country in the American continent 
to gain its independence (1804) even before the United States, and when it is a country of ethnic 
and racial homogeneity?    
The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean provide the most elaborate and most 
developed example of racial inter-mixture in the world. But they still owe a historical debt to the 
black and indigenous populations, who continue to be excluded and marginalized and have the 
lowest human development ratings.     
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